The North Atlantic Treaty Organization boasts several of the most prominent sniping programs in the world, each with a distinct and distinguished history. They helped found the modern sniper role and continue to perpetuate it today, but can those individual legacies guarantee that sniping will continue to play a part in the alliance’s future?
When considering the future of snipers in NATO it is important to do so within the context of the group’s primary purpose: forming a defensive alliance to counter the Soviet Union and later Russia. This focus has been renewed and reaffirmed with the invasion of Ukraine and subsequent addition of Finland and Sweden to the coalition. Following such events, it seems appropriate that the future of sniping within the alliance still be measured primarily in relation to a European conflict. This could be in the form of asymmetrical/irregular warfare or an all-out war where Article 5 of NATO’s charter is invoked, obligating all allies to come to the defense of an attacked member. Since its inception, the organization has tackled many crises and conflicts both within Europe and otherwise, but their key concern remains the Russian Federation and their belligerent tendencies.
When it comes to such a conflict with the alliance’s traditional foe, it seems certain that snipers will be called on as part of an effective defense. A large number of the allies have strong sniping programs and exceptionally capable marksmen, although their immediate utilization could depend a lot on where war breaks out. Finland, for example, has a strong sniping legacy and has crafted a defensive strategy focused on falling back to dense forests and favorable terrain from which the invader can more easily be beaten back through counter attacks.1 Other countries on the frontier with Russia don’t have quite as pronounced reputations as shooters as Finland, but with a potential European war guaranteed to be predominantly land-based, all snipers will have ample opportunity to distinguish themselves through support of larger infantry elements, reconnaissance responsibilities, and striking at priority targets. Snipers have other benefits that they could provide NATO forces, such as psychological impacts on enemy morale and the potential to be used in so-called “stay behind” operations if alliance forces are driven back. Most notably developed through Operation Gladio and similar NATO-aligned initiatives of the Cold War, stay behind operations prepare forces to hide away during occupation and lead resistance to foreign invaders. The stealth and reconnaissance tasks involved in such missions make snipers ideal operatives for potential stay behind tactics in addition to their more traditional wartime responsibilities.
An extrapolation of modern history confirms the likely prevalence of sniping in a future European war. Whether in the trenches of World War I or in the more dynamic combat of World War II, snipers have proven to be an important part of the major modern wars on the continent. The strategic culture in Europe has repeatedly brought about a focus on precision fire, perhaps more so than any other region. The war in Ukraine, however, gives some indication that snipers could see a more limited role on a future battlefield swarmed by drones and constantly scanned using advanced technologies. Even so, snipers are being used in the conflict and a potential war involving Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Finland, and many others with strong legacies of marksmanship would be very unlikely to bypass the craft completely. If anything, they are the militaries most likely to rapidly adapt snipers to the new age of warfare showcased in Ukraine, considering their proximity and interest in the conflict and the allies’ consistent focus on working with technology on the battlefield. Strong sniping programs, distinguished legacies, and geographic realities mean that off all the future wars that could erupt, one involving NATO and Russia would be perhaps the most consequential for the field of sniping.
Even if NATO were to become involved in a war other than a large-scale conflict with Russia, it is likely that snipers would play an important role. If engaging in a counterinsurgency or managing a local crisis, marksmanship is likely to be emphasized by allies of the organization. Consider the only time Article 5 has been invoked, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and the following success of snipers from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and others involved in the Global War on Terror.
In the advent of an all-out war with not Russia, but China, Iran, North Korea, or another rival that triggers an invocation of Article 5, NATO nations would hold a sniping advantage but may not have the chance to implement them as fully. Those three potential adversaries have their own unique sniper programs with notable features, although they in general fall short of the skill and prestige of those of the treaty organization. But lacking borders with NATO allies (except for Iran’s border with Turkey), any conflict with these or other foes besides Russia would probably not initially feature marksmanship to the degree that a European war would. Once either side had established an invading land force, it then seems guaranteed that the NATO community would leverage its distinguished sniping history and skill to great effect.
There are many capable snipers that would be fighting for NATO if called on today, but their actual future implementation and tactics are entirely dependent on the actions and strategies of the countries that make up the alliance. NATO itself doesn’t dictate or control the use of marksmen or any other tactical component, focusing instead on grand strategy and geopolitics. The treaty organization’s sniping capabilities are thus vulnerable to the decisions of the militaries of the various allies, but with 32 members, it is unlikely that NATO will ever be caught without a substantial force of snipers. Any individual country could be caught unable to outshoot Russian or other aggressors, but they could almost certainly count on a capable ally to aid them.
The greater future concern for NATO’s snipers and allies in general would be a political division in the alliance that would cause a breakdown in the defensive pact. If the formidable military of the United States does not come to Europe’s defense when attacked by Russia, or if any other country undermines NATO’s unity in the face of an all-out war, then the use of snipers will be an individual matter for each country. If the United States adopts an extreme isolationist mentality and ignores Article 5 when Russia attacks, there will obviously be far fewer snipers in Europe when they are desperately needed. The United Kingdom, Canada, and other allies with strong sniping programs are similarly far from nations on the front lines, leaving the first victims without many of the world’s most capable shooters if the alliance becomes politically compromised.
A NATO that is functioning as intended and confronts Russia with its full capacity will showcase snipers perhaps better than any other armed force could. As a strictly defensive alliance facing an invader, their marksmen will have the advantages of operating on their own familiar terrain where they can prepare and lie in wait for advancing armies. A nation on the front lines would have snipers from any number of its capable allies to support and train its own, and 32 individual sniping programs could independently innovate and share their knowledge with each other. As an example, British snipers have recently applied lessons from Ukraine to their exercises, experimenting with more active roles in armored infantry and emphasizing the importance of their concealment skills for a new age of warfare that is heavily reliant on multi-layered surveillance.2 With each experienced ally testing new doctrines and strategies like this, a NATO at war would function as the world’s premier sniping laboratory.
For snipers to be such a prominent feature of NATO’s future, the alliance only needs to maintain the course it is on. Member nations should continue to train and exercise together, promoting a common respect for marksmanship and related field craft. Most importantly, the allies that actively produce some of the world’s most distinguished snipers should capitalize on and expand their expertise, doing nothing to give up their advantage. While other countries in the North Atlantic community should also strive for a certain level of sniping competence, not all of them need to be among the world’s best. A diversity of talents and specialties serves the alliance well, and the most capable snipers can assist and train their international colleagues when needed. Leaders in the alliance and community should make conscious efforts to maintain a collective sniping ability well beyond that of Russia and other rivals by adapting the role to new combat technologies and learning from ongoing conflicts.
The success of snipers within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization demonstrates how the common history and goals of the alliance give it and allied militaries strength. As it has flourished, so have the marksmen within it. A strong NATO means an active community for the world’s greatest snipers, making their futures indisputably linked.
Stirling E.
Sniper Central Global Affairs Analyst
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